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Abortion: Three Perspectives, by Michael Tooley, Celia Wolf-Devine, Philip
E. Devine, and Alison M. Jaggar. Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 272.
Francis J. Beckwith, Baylor University
It has been nearly four decades since the U.S. Supreme Court held that
there is a right to abortion protected by the U.S. Constitution. Yet, the question of abortion’s moral and legal permissibility, and all the attendant issues about the nature of law, human persons, and morality, continue to be
seriously (and sometimes not so seriously) engaged in the public square.
Given the metaphysical, ethical, and political issues on which abortion’s
moral and legal status seems to hinge, philosophers have had a special
interest in offering their own assessments of the subject.
In this book, three philosophical perspectives on abortion are offered
for our consideration. The first, defended by Michael Tooley, is a liberal
perspective on abortion. For Tooley, abortion is morally and legally permissible because the fetus, the unborn human being that dies as a consequence of an abortion, is not a person, and only persons can have a right
to continued existence. Celia Wolf-Devine and Philip E. Devine are the
authors of the second chapter, a communitarian prolife perspective. They
offer arguments to support their belief that the unborn human being is a
full-fledged member of the human community from the moment it comes
into existence, and thus it is no different in its intrinsic dignity than you
or me. For this reason, abortion, except for in the case of endangerment to
the mother’s life, is unjustified homicide, and thus ought to be forbidden
by our laws. Allison M. Jaggar asks us to consider a third perspective in a
chapter entitled “Abortion Rights and Gender Justice: An Essay on Political Philosophy.” Jaggar maintains that the right to abortion is essential to
women’s equality, because child bearing and child rearing are burdens
peculiar to women, and because prolifers have not met their philosophical
burden to demonstrate the unborn’s personhood. These three presentations are followed by three separate rebuttals. In each of these chapters
each author rebuts the arguments of the initial chapters of the other two.
Contemporary Christians are divided on the issue of abortion.1 And yet,
there has been, since the time of the Early Church until the mid-twentieth
century, an unbroken line of moral opposition to abortion.2 Even when
1
See, for example, Robert Wennberg, Life in the Balance: Exploring the Abortion Controversy
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1985); and Francis J. Beckwith, Defending Life: A Moral and
Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
2
Writes theologian Nigel M. de S. Cameron: “For the whole of Christian history until
appreciably after 1900, so far as we can trace it, there was virtual unanimity amongst Christians, evangelical, catholic, orthodox, that unless at the direct command of God, it was in all
cases wrong directly to take innocent human life. Abortion and infanticide were grouped
together as early as the writing called the Didache which comes from the first century after
the crucifixion. These deeds were grouped with murder in that those committing or co-operating in them were, when penitent, still excluded from Communion for ten years by early
Councils. . . . The absolute war was against the deliberate taking of innocent life, not in the
sense of sinless life, but in the sense of life which was innocens (not harming). . . . We may
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Christian philosophers and theologians disagreed on when the fetus was
ensouled, the termination of that being’s life was still considered gravely
immoral. Thomas Aquinas, for example, maintained that the fetus was not
ensouled until many weeks after conception.3 Nevertheless, he still maintained the grave immorality of abortion both before and after ensoulment,
with the latter being homicide.4 And in the case of Thomas and other philosophers who entertained the question, what was doing most of the work
in their judgments were philosophical and scientific arguments informed
by their biblical and theological traditions. Thus, philosophy has a pride
of place in these sorts of discussions, especially among contemporary
Christian philosophers struggling to find a way to think clearly about this
contentious issue. Thus, this book serves as a nice introduction to Christian philosophers on how the contemporary debate is laid out.
Nevertheless, as with any book that tries to cover an issue of such
boundless controversy that overlaps so many areas of academic research,
including several sub-disciplines within just philosophy, there are places
in which the book falls short. The following are a few that stand out.
Tooley maintains that the prolife case relies on its proponents’ belief that
the unborn possesses an immaterial soul. He suggests that we investigate
whether any non-materialist view of the human being can withstand the
scrutiny of “science.” And, then, in several paragraphs he concludes that
some form of mind-body physicalism is the right view. But he does so without critiquing, or even introducing the reader to, the many sophisticated
note that this strictness constituted one of the most dramatic identifiable differences between
Christian morality and pagan, Greek or Roman, morality.” (Nigel M. de S. Cameron and
Pamela F. Sims, Abortion: The Crisis in Morals and Medicine [Leicester, England: InterVarsity
Press, 1986], p. 29). For more on the Early Church’s view on abortion, see Michael Gorman,
Abortion and the Early Church (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1982).
3
See John Haldane and Patrick Lee, “Aquinas on Ensoulment, Abortion, and the Value of
Life,” Philosophy 78 (2003); and Benedict Ashley and Albert Moraczewski, “Cloning, Aquinas, and the Embryonic Person,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 1.2 (Summer 2001). Ashley and Moraczewski write:
Aquinas . . . did not know that the matter out of which the human body is generated
is already highly organized at conception and endowed with the efficient and formal
causality necessary to organize itself into a system in which, as it matures, the brain
becomes the principal adult organ. Hence he was forced to resort to the hypothesis
that the male semen remains in the womb, gradually organizing the menstrual blood,
first to the level of vegetative life and then to the level of animal life, so as to be capable
of the further self-development needed for ensoulment. But he also supposed that
this entire process from its initiation was teleologically (final cause) predetermined
to produce a human person, not a vegetable, an infra-human animal, or a mere embryonic collection of independent cells. That is why the Catholic Church has always
taught that even if it were true that personal ensoulment takes place sometime after
conception, nevertheless abortion at any stage is a very grave sin against the dignity
of a human person. (p. 200)
4
Aquinas writes: “He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be
excused from homicide, especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.”
(IIaIIae q. 64 art. 8, in The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2nd ed. and rev. ed, 1920;
literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province; Online Edition; Copyright
© 2008 by Kevin Knight, available at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3064.htm).
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critiques of physicalism that have been offered in the literature and could
increase the plausibility of the prolife view of the human person.5
Tooley seems to think that when a prolifer writes of the unborn’s soul
she means the unborn’s mind (or mental properties or mental acts). But
the philosophical anthropology of most prolife philosophers in fact does
not maintain that mental properties or the exercise of mental powers is
what endows a human being with intrinsic value. Rather, it is the view
that the human being is a certain sort of substance—a rational animal—
whose mental properties and powers are perfections that it is intrinsically
directed as a whole to bring to fruition. The soul, according to this view, is
the form of the body. Thus, the human being is a hylomorphic substance
that remains identical to itself over time, even when it loses and gains
parts as a consequence of development, growth, disease, or external force.
Consider this example.
Bioethicist David W. Brock cites Carol Kahn’s proposal for a possible
use of human cloning, in which she suggests that “[a]fter cell differentiation, some of the brain cells of the embryo or fetus [clone] would be removed so that it could then be grown as a brain-dead body for spare parts
for its earlier twin.”6 According to Brock, “this body clone would be like
an anencephalic newborn or presentient fetus, neither of whom arguably
can be harmed, because of their lack of capacity for consciousness.” Yet,
Brock maintains, “most people would likely find” the practice of purposely creating non-sentient human beings “appalling and immoral, in part
because here the cloned later twin’s capacity for conscious life is destroyed
solely as a means to benefit another.”7 It is not precisely clear, given Tooley’s account of fetal rights, what would be wrong with cloning brainless
human beings for the purpose of harvesting their organs. According to
Tooley, “an entity cannot have a right to continued existence—or, indeed
any rights at all—unless it either has, or has had, conscious desires” (p.
10). The pre-brain embryo is thus not a subject of rights. Therefore, on
Tooley’s account, it is difficult to know where exactly one would locate
the wrong in creating brainless children for others. One could, I suppose,
locate the wrong in the moral intuition that the pre-brain embryo is deprived of something to which he is entitled. But if that is the case, then the
past acquisition or presence of conscious desires is a condition that is not
5
See, for example, Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2008); William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1999); J. P. Moreland, Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument (New York:
Routledge, 2008); Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997); and Charles Taliaferro, Consciousness and the Mind of God (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
6
David W. Brock, “Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and
Con,” in National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings, vol. 2 (Rockville,
MD: The Commission, 1997), p. E8, citing Carol Kahn, “Can We Achieve Immortality?: The
Ethics of Cloning and Other Life Extension Technologies,” Free Inquiry (Spring 1989), pp.
14–18.
7
Brock, “Cloning Human Beings,” pp. E8, E9.
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necessary in order for a human being to possess a right not to be harmed
and thus a right to continued existence as the sort of being whose nature is
intrinsically directed toward certain perfections such as the development
of the brain and mental functions. Yet, what follows is that the intentional
creation of brainless children (or embryos) for the purpose of harvesting
their organs is a serious wrong. But if we were to extract from this insight
the principle that seems to ground this wrong—it is prima facie wrong to
destroy the physical structure necessary for the realization of a human being’s present capacity for the exercisability of a function that is a perfection
of its nature—then the pre-brain embryo is a subject of rights even if it has
not acquired any conscious desires. The wrongness in purposely creating
brainless embryos seems to be grounded in the fact that the embryo is a
being of a particular sort, a rational animal, who is deprived of real goods
when it is killed or maimed, and these goods are ones which its nature is
intrinsically directed to achieve for its own perfection.
Both Jaggar and the Devines spend far too much space on arguments
about the practical consequences of the right to abortion on women’s lives.
Jaggar argues that the consequences are good. The Devines argue the opposite. Both offer compelling and emotionally moving cases, peppered
with statistics and claims of group harm and benefit. Although these are
no doubt important points to make in policy discussions, I’m not sure this
approach to the issue is philosophically helpful. For it seems to me that the
moral question is logically prior to the policy one.
Consider, for example, what is called the “common ground” position.
It was one suggested by President Barack Obama in his 2009 commencement address at the University of Notre Dame: “Because . . . when we
open our hearts and our minds to those who may not think like we do
or believe what we do[,] that’s when we discover at least the possibility
of common ground. That’s when we begin to say, `Maybe we won’t agree
on abortion, but we can still agree that this is a heart-wrenching decision
for any woman to make, with both moral and spiritual dimensions. So
let’s work together to reduce the number of women seeking abortions
by reducing unintended pregnancies, and making adoption more available, and providing care and support for women who do carry their
child to term.’”8
Moved to action by this speech, suppose that prochoice advocates,
including Jaggar and Tooley, agree to join forces with the Devines and
other prolife supporters to reduce abortions by lobbying the government
to offer financial incentives to women in crisis pregnancies (e.g., welfare,
free housing and food, underwriting adoption services, etc.). And suppose their lobbying succeeds and the abortion rate is in fact reduced as a
consequence of this policy. Should the Devines be happy about this result?
There is a good reason to believe that they should not be.
8
President Barack Obama, “Commencement Address,” University of Notre Dame (17 May
2009), available at http://commencement.nd.edu/commencement-weekend/commencementvideos-recorded/commencement-address/
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The prolife position, according to the Devines, is that all members of
the human community, including the unborn, have inestimable and equal
worth and dignity and thus are entitled to the fundamental protection of
the laws. “Reducing the number of abortions” could occur in a regime of
law in which this principle of justice is denied, and that is the regime that
Jaggar and Tooley want to preserve and extend. It is a regime in which the
continued existence of the unborn is always at the absolute discretion of
others who happen to possess the power to decide to kill them or let them
live. Reducing the number of these discretionary acts of killing simply by
trying to pacify and/or accommodate the needs of those who want to procure or encourage abortions only reinforces the idea that the unborn are
subhuman creatures whose value depends exclusively on someone else’s
wanting them or deciding that they are worthy of being permitted to live.
So, in theory at least, there could be fewer abortions while the culture
drifts further away from the prolife perspective and the law becomes increasingly unjust.
There are, of course, other objections one can raise about the arguments
and stances presented by these authors. But, in general, this is a well balanced and carefully argued work. Each author defends his or her position with clarity and philosophical rigor. These are four very good philosophers, each of whom has contributed to contemporary philosophy in
varied and important ways. Anyone who is interested in applied ethics in
general, and how philosophers debate the issue of abortion in particular,
should have this book in his or her library.

Real Essentialism, by David S. Oderberg. Routledge, 2007. Pp. xiii + 314.
$115.00 (cloth), $39.95 (paper)
EDWARD FESER, Pasadena City College
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in themes from Aristotelian
and Thomistic metaphysics, though for the most part philosophers have
skirted around the edges, exploring possible contemporary applications
only of certain (seemingly) isolable doctrines—Aristotle’s conception of
the soul as the form of the body, say, or Aquinas’s philosophical theology. David Oderberg’s compelling new book Real Essentialism goes well
beyond such piecemeal retrieval and argues for a wholesale reconsideration of the Aristotelian-Thomistic (A-T) system. His aim is to lay bare the
interconnections between the key A-T concepts—hylemorphism, act and
potency, substantial form, prime matter, essence and existence, substance
and accident, genus and species, and so forth—to defend them against
common misunderstandings and serious criticisms alike, to relate them
to current controversies in analytic metaphysics, to apply them to issues
in various other areas of philosophy, and to demonstrate their continuing

